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ARGUMENT 
L A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION ACCRUES UPON THE BREACH. 
NOT WITH THE DAMAGE, SINCE RB&G BREACHED UPON 
RENDERING ITS FAULTY REPORTS IN 1993 AND 1995 (BEFORE 
DEVELOPMENT CORP. TRANSFERRED ITS INTEREST IN THE RB&G 
CONTRACTS TO ENTERPRISES), ENTERPRISES CAN PROPERLY 
ASSERT A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION AGAINST RB&G. 
Appellants Sunridge Development Corporation ("Development Corp.") and 
Sunridge Enterprises, LLC ("Enterprises") do not take issue with the well-settled 
proposition that an assignee "stands in the shoes" of the assignor, or that an assignee 
"cannot recover more than the assignor could recover . . . ." SME Indus., Inc. v. 
Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs.} Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 676 (Utah 2001) (citation 
and quotation omitted). Rather, Development Corp. asserts that since a breach of 
contract cause of action accrues upon the breach—not at the time of the damage— 
Development Corp. assigned a valid, completed breach of contract cause of action to 
Enterprises in 1996.1 Therefore, Enterprises can properly assert its breach of contract 
cause of action against RB&G for the lost fourteen units, which would have been 
Development Corp. damages. Or, in Appellee RB&G Engineering, Inc's ("RB&G") 
terms, both Development Corp. and Enterprises wore a size nine shoe. 
1
 RB&G uses different cases, including Wiscombe v. Lockhart Co., 608 P.2d 236, 
238 (Utah 1980), to argue that an assignee's rights are limited when the assignor assigns 
only "a portion of its rights under the contract " (Br. of Appellee 8.) But it is 
undisputed that in this case, Development Corp. assigned all—not just "a portion"—of its 
rights under its contracts with RB&G to Enterprises. (R. at 393.) Indeed, subsequent to 
the assignment, Development Corp. was no longer a party to the RB&G contract, and 
Development Corp. wholly terminated its privity with RB&G. Thus, RB&G's 
incongruous arguments and cases are inapposite. 
1 
A breach of contract requires four essential elements of proof: "(1) a contract, (2) 
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of contract by the other party, and 
(4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001). 
Generally, a cause of action "accrues and the relevant statute of limitations begins 
to run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." 
Clarke v. Living Scriptures, Inc., 114 P.3d 602, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). But this is not 
the case with a cause of action for breach of contract: "a contract action ordinarily 
accrues at the time of breach." S & GInc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 
740 (Utah 1996); see also Clarke, 114 P.3d at 603 (holding that a breach of contract 
cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at the time of the 
breach). 
The breach of contract actions against RB&G accrued in 1993 and 1995 when 
RB&G failed to identify the existing faults on the Alpine Brook property. Thus, at those 
moments, Development Corp. could assert breach of contract actions against RB&G for 
damages, although the damages were yet undiscovered (hence the delay in asserting the 
claim and the reason for applying the "discovery rule," discussed in Section II infra). 
Importantly, as though not clear enough, RB&G admitted it breached the 
contracts with Development Corp. At the summary judgment hearing, in arguing that 
Enterprises could not assert a breach of contract claim against RB&G, its counsel said 
"the difference here, your Honor, is the contract was fully performed and breached 
before the assignment occurs." (R. at 744, p.52 (emphasis added).) A moment later, he 
reiterated, "so when [the contracts were] assigned, [they 're] breached contract[s], " (R. 
at 744, p. 52 (emphasis added).) 
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Therefore, when Development Corp. transferred to Enterprises all of Development 
Corp.'s interest in the two contracts with RB&G, Enterprises could (as the assignee and 
successor-in-interest) assert the breach of contract actions against RB&G that 
Development Corp. could have asserted. As RB&G rightly pointed out, the assignee 
receives just what the assignor had—nothing more, and nothing less. 
IL SINCE DEVELOPMENT CORP./ENTERPRISES DID NOT DISCOVER— 
AND COULD NOT HAVE REASONABLY DISCOVERED—RB&G9S 
BREACHES UNTIL YEARS LATER, THE COURT SHOULD APPLY THE 
"DISCOVERY RULE" TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
Clearly then, and by RB&G's own admission, RB&G breached the contracts with 
Development Corp. before the assignment. But Development Corp. did not immediately 
bring suit upon discovery of the breaches because Development Corp. did not know 
about the breaches until 1998 when the Utah Geological Survey ("UGS") notified 
Enterprises of existing faults under the property which necessitated a re-design and which 
results in the lost fourteen units. Further, neither Development Corp. nor Enterprises 
could have known about the faults until UGS notified them; indeed, Development Corp. 
specifically contracted with and relied on RB&G to discover any faults and to avoid this 
kind of costly surprise. The Court should apply the "discovery rule" to toll the statute of 
limitations, making Development Corp./Enterprises' claims timely filed. 
As noted above, a cause of action generally accrues "'upon the happening of the 
last event necessary to complete the cause of action.5" Hill v. Alfred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1275 
(Utah 2001) (quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)); see also Olsen 
v. Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1347 (Utah 1993) (stating that a limitations period "begins to 
3 
run when the cause of action accrues"). This rule is different for contract actions, 
however, with accrual of the action upon the breach. S & G Inc., 913 P.2d at 740. 
Therefore, since the statute of limitations for suit upon a written contract is six years, 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 78-12-23(2), the statute of limitations would have expired by the 
time Development Corp./Enterprises filed their claims in 2003. 
But as with most rules of law, "[t]here are a number of exceptions to this general 
rule [that a statute of limitations begins to run when the action accrues]." Myers, 635 P.2d 
at 86. One such exception is the "discovery rule," which "toll[s] the limitations period 
'until the discovery of facts forming the basis for the cause of action.'" Hill, 25 P.3d at 
1275 (quoting Myers, 635 P.2d at 86). In other words, applying the discovery rule 
prevents the limitations period from beginning to run "until the facts forming the 
foundation for the cause of action are discovered" Hill, 25 P.3d at 1275 (emphasis 
added); see also Olsen, 865 P.2d at 1348 ("Under the discovery rule, a statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of, the facts that give rise to the cause of 
action."). 
There are two types of discovery rules: a "statutory discovery rule" and an 
"equitable discovery rule," Moore v. Smith, 158 P.3d 562, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 2007), the 
latter of which applies in this case. The "equitable discovery rule" applies in two 
situations: 
(1) where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because 
of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct, and 
4 
(2) where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of 
the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing 
that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action. 
Mardanlou v. Ghaffarian, 135 P.3d 904, 910 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). 
This case justifies applying the second rationale of the equitable discovery rule. 
Development Corp. hired RB&G to perform not one, but two, esoteric, technical, and 
scientific analyses of the Alpine Brook property to determine whether there were 
geologic faults that would affect the design of and construction on the property. RB&G 
issued the reports, and Development Corp. (and subsequently Enterprises) relied upon 
them. Indeed, Development Corp. specifically procured geotechnical reports from 
RB&G to avoid any surprises once design and construction began. Yet in 1998, three 
years after RB&G's final report, UGS notified Enterprises of the faults that existed on the 
property and that Enterprises had to complete a re-design to compensate for the existing 
faults. This re-design resulted in the lost fourteen units and a loss of more than a million 
dollars for Development Corp./Enterprises. 
If the Court refuses to apply the equitable discovery rule in this case, it would 
work an injustice on Development Corp. and Enterprises. They had no reason to know 
of, and had no ability to discover, RB&G's breaches and the damages therefrom until 
UGS notified Enterprises in 1998 of the faults that RB&G had missed. Indeed, 
Development Corp. contracted with RB&G precisely to avoid this kind of costly surprise. 
If the Court does not apply the discovery rule, it is implying Development Corp. should 
have engaged another geotechnical firm to verify RB&G's analyses and reports so that 
5 
Development Corp. could have discovered RB&G's breaches immediately after it issued 
its reports. This is an illogical, inequitable expectation. 
The lost fourteen units are a "latent injury," as discussed in Christiansen v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., where this Court applied the discovery rule to toll a statute of limitations 
period when the plaintiff did not know or have reason to know "of the existence and 
cause of the injury which is the basis of his action." 136 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Utah 2006). 
Just as in Christiansen, Development Corp. and Enterprises did not know, and had no 
reason to know, of the existence of the cause of injury (or the injury itself) until 1998. 
Thus, the Court should apply the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations in this 
case. 
Moreover, in Myers, the Utah Supreme Court applied the discovery rule to toll a 
statute of limitations because "the plaintiffs were unaware of the facts giving rise to their 
cause of action." Myers, 635 P.2d at 87. Similarly, in this case, neither Development 
Corp. nor Enterprises was aware of RB&G's breaches until UGS informed Enterprises in 
1998 of the faults on the property that RB&G missed, which resulted in the lost fourteen 
units. Everything to satisfy a cause of action had occurred—it was just a question of 
when Development Corp./Enterprises discovered it. Or, in the Utah Supreme Court's 
language, this Court should apply the discovery rule and toll the statute of limitations 
because "[Development Corp./Enterprises] were unaware of the facts giving rise to their 
cause of action." Therefore, the statute of limitations should not have begun until 
Enterprises learned of RB&G's breaches in 1998 from UGS. 
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The Olsen case clearly establishes that "a statute of limitations does not begin to 
run until the plaintiff learns of, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have 
learned of, the facts that give rise to the cause of action." 865 P.2d at 1348. Since 
neither Development Corp. nor Enterprises learned of (or could have learned of) RB&G's 
breaches until UGS notified Enterprises in 1998 of the existing faults, the statute of 
limitations did not begin to run until then. Thus, Enterprises5 breach of contract claim 
was timely filed. 
HI. UNDER THE SME CASE, ENTERPRISES CAN RECOVER FOR THE 
LOST 14 UNITS BECAUSE THOSE DAMAGES BELONGED TO 
DEVELOPMENT CORP, WHEN IT ASSIGNED ITS INTEREST IN THE 
RB&G CONTRACTS TO ENTERPRISES IN 1998. 
In its opening brief, Development Corp./Enterprises adequately addressed how 
SME is different from the instant case, so they need not re-state that lengthy argument. 
The crux of the SME case is this: in SME, the assignee's recovery was limited to 
the assignor's damages ($150,000) because the assignor had already incurred those 
damages by settling for $150,000.3 The assignor effectively capped the damages the 
assignee could recover by settling with the breaching party, thus incurring damages in the 
amount of $ 150,000. The assignee could not recover more than $ 150,000 from the 
RB&G concedes this important point in its brief, but then argues it is an 
"assumption" in the SME opinion. (Br. of Appellee 13.) Development 
Corp./Enterprises' view on this point is the most logical, reasonable reading of the SME 
opinion. The assignee's damages were limited to $150,000 because the assignor had 
already settled for $150,000 prior to the assignment. The proposition is neither 
complicated nor a stretch of the SME opinion. 
7 
breaching party because $150,000 is the amount that the assignor actually recovered from 
the breaching party—nothing more. 
Therefore, Enterprises does not take issue with the general proposition that an 
assignee cannot recover more than the assignor could recover. But in the instant case, by 
virtue of (1) the breach of contract action accruing in 1993 and 1995 upon breach, (2) the 
absence of an artificial cap on Development Corp.'s damages (as there was for the 
assignor in SME), and (3) the privity between Enterprises and RB&G, Enterprises can 
recover for the lost fourteen units. Any other conclusion would sequester RB&G's 
liability for its conceded breaches of the 1993 and 1995 contracts in a legal black hole, 
permitting no party to recover for the damages caused by the breaches, which position 
RB&G espouses in its brief by attributing RB&G's absence of liability on Development 
Corp.'s assignment to Enterprises. 
Moreover, Enterprises is not trying to recover more than Development Corp. could 
have recovered. Enterprises is trying to recover the same damages Development Corp. 
would have recovered but for the assignment to Enterprises.4 RB&G should not be able 
RB&G argues that since Development Corp. originally asserted its own claim for 
breach of contract, Enterprises cannot assert and win on the same claim. (Br. of Appellee 
12-13.) This is a nonsensical argument. Development Corp. did initially assert a breach 
of contact claim against RB&G, but pursuant to the trial court's ruling on the second 
motion for summary judgment, the court held that Development Corp. lacked proof of 
damages, and the claim failed. (R. at 700-04.) If the trial court was correct, the only 
other party that could have possibly suffered those damages is Enterprises. And due to 
the privity between Enterprises and RB&G pursuant to the assignment, Enterprises is the 
proper party to assert and recover on the breach of contract claim. 
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to skirt liability for its breaches based on its contrived reading of the SME case and based 
on the assignment to Enterprises. 
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court misapplied the SME case, 
thereby precluding Enterprises from recovering for RB&G's admitted breaches of the 
1993 and 1995 contracts. Alternatively, at a minimum, there exist genuine issues of 
material facts whether Enterprises can recover for the lost fourteen units based on 
RB&G's breach. Thus, this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of partial 
summary judgment. 
IY, ALTERNATIVELY, DEVELOPMENT CORP. SUFFERED THE 
DAMAGES BEFORE THE ASSIGNMENT TO ENTERPRISES BY 
RELYING ON RB&G'S REPORTS. THEREFORE, THE ASSIGNMENT 
IN 1996 ENCOMPASSED ALL FOUR ELEMENTS OF ENTERPRISES' 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM. 
In the alternative, Development Corp. asserts that it was damaged before the 
assignment of the RB&G contract to Enterprises in 1996. Therefore, all the elements of a 
breach of contract action were satisfied while Development Corp. was a party to the 
RB&G contract. As a result, the subsequent assignment to Enterprises transferred the 
completed breach of contract cause of action, thus, Enterprises can recover for the lost 
fourteen units. 
A. All Four Elements for a Breach of Contract Cause of Action Were Satisfied 
Before the Assignment to Enterprises. Therefore, the Assignment 
Transferred Development Corp.'s Contractual Right to Recover for the Lost 
14 Units to Enterprises. 
A breach of contract requires four essential elements of proof: "(1) a contract, (2) 
performance by the party seeking recovery, (3) breach of contract by the other party, and 
9 
(4) damages." Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 20 P.3d 388, 392 (Utah 2001). In this case, 
all four elements were satisfied as to Development. RB&G and Development Corp. 
clearly had a contract for services in both 1993 and 1995. (R. at 369-70.) Development 
Corp. performed by paying for RB&G's services. (R. at 369-71.) RB&G breached by 
failing to identify the faults that the Utah Geological Survey ultimately discovered. (R. at 
369-71.) (RB&G also admitted it breached the contract. R. at (R. at 744, p. 52.) And 
Development Corp. incurred damages once it relied on RB&G's report and proceeded to 
develop the Alpine Brook property, including designing the property, laying roads, 
installing utilities, and transferring the Alpine Brook project to another entity (i.e., 
Enterprises). (R. at 375-76.) 
All the elements of the breach of contract cause of action occurred while 
Development Corp. was still a party to the contract with RB&G. So when Development 
Corp. assigned its interest in the contract to Enterprises, it assigned that completed cause 
of action. Thus, Enterprises received precisely what Development Corp. had, allowing 
Enterprises to sue RB&G for breach of contract. 
R The Breach of Contract Cause of Action Accrued Once Enterprises 
Discovered It, Which Was Subsequent to the Assignment From 
Development Corp. 
Although the elements for the breach of contract cause of action were met while 
Development Corp. was a party to the contract with RB&G, under the "discovery rule," 
that cause of action did not accrue until it was discovered, which occurred in 1998 when 
10 
UGS notified Enterprises that faults existed on the property. Only then did the statute of 
limitations begin to run on the breach of contract claim. 
In support of this alternative argument, Development Corp./Enterprises 
incorporates and applies the discussion of the "discovery rule" from Section II supra. 
V. DEVELOPMENT CORP, AND ENTERPRISES ARE NOT 
"DISREGARDHNG1 THE CORPORATE FORM/9 
RB&G cites inapposite cases and principles dealing with corporate stock and 
corporate share holders to argue Development Corp. and Enterprises are "disregarding] 
the corporate form for some purposes, but observing] it when it is convenient to do so." 
(Br. of Appellee 14.) This is a weak argument and a red herring, and the scant treatment 
RB&G gives it in its brief reflects such. 
In his deposition, Steven Stewart, the principal of both Development Corp. and 
Enterprises, testified that his attorneys told him "liability exposure would be less with an 
LLC" (r. at 268), thus, he organized Enterprises, a Utah limited liability corporation, in 
1996. Steward did not create Enterprises for any fraudulent, improper, or illegal purpose. 
He engaged in a commonplace business practice of organizing a limited liability 
company to take advantage of its legal status. Neither has Mr. Stewart sporadically 
observed corporate form for these two entities. Rather, they were, and always have been, 
distinct legal entities. Development Corp. assigned its interest in the RB&G contracts to 
Enterprises to take advantage of the legal benefits of an LLC, not to "avoid liabilities." 
(Br. of Appellee 14.) This everyday, routine business re-organization should not 
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preclude Development Corp./Enterprises from asserting their claims against RB&G for 
negligence and its admitted breaches. 
VL DEVELOPMENT CORP.'S NEGLIGENCE CLAIM IS PROPERLY PART 
OF THIS APPEAL, AS THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY HELD IN 
ITS RULING ON THE FIRST SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT THE 
ECONOMIC LOSS RULE BARRED DEVELOPMENT CORP.'S 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM. 
In further effort to avoid any liability whatsoever for its negligence and conceded 
breaches, RB&G argues that Development Corp.'s negligence claims are not properly 
before the Court. But this is contrary to the record. 
On March 9, 2005, RB&G moved for summary judgment and partial summary 
judgment. (R. at 366.) In that motion, RB&G specifically argued that the economic loss 
rule barred Development Corp.'s and Enterprises negligence claims. (R. at 235-238.) 
Then, in Development Corp./Enterprises5 opposition, they directly addressed those 
arguments, asserting that the economic loss rule did not bar the negligence claims. (R. at 
384-387.) In RB&G's reply brief, it not only dealt with the economic loss rule, but it 
expressly addressed whether RB&G owed Development Corp./Enterprises an 
independent duty (r. at 501-504), for which Development Corp./Enterprises now argues. 
In an August 2, 2005 ruling the trial court focused on the parties' discussion of the 
negligence claims and the application of the economic loss rule. In its ruling, the Court 
wrote "that the economic loss rule holds that economic losses are not recoverable in 
negligence absent physical damage or bodily injury. . . . The Court, therefore, for the 
12 
reasons stated in [RB&G's] memoranda, finds that [Development Corp.'s] and 
[Enterprises'] negligence claims are barred by the economic loss rule." (R. at 539.) 
Subsequently, the parties stipulated that the first motion for summary judgment 
ruling from August 2, 2005 (the one addressed above) was appealable.5 (R. at 737-38.) 
Thus, Development Corp.'s negligence claim was not subject to the waiver of appeal, and 
it is squarely before the Court. 
VII THIS COURT SHOULD EXEMPT ENGINEERING PROFESSIONALS 
FROM THE "EVER-EXPANDING, ALL CONSUMING," "SWELLING 
GLOBULE"6 THAT IS THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE. 
In its opening brief, Development Corp. thoroughly laid out its arguments with 
respect to why the economic loss rule should not apply to engineering professionals like 
RB&G, so Development Corp. will not restate those arguments here. A few points, 
however, are worth addressing in light of RB&G's arguments. 
A. Development Corp., Not Enterprises, Is Asserting a Negligence Claim. 
RB&G is confused as to which Appellant is asserting the negligence claim. 
RB&G argues that since Enterprises is not a party to the contracts with RB&G (which in 
any event is inaccurate, since it is the assignee on those contracts), it cannot assert a tort 
5
 As RB&G recognizes, the parties stipulated that Development Corp. and 
Enterprises would not appeal the second motion for summary judgment, which 
stipulation Development Corp. and Enterprises adheres to today. The second motion for 
summary judgment is not at issue in this appeal. RB&G's argument is a red herring. 
6
 These quotes are attributable to Justice Bradley of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
as cited in 1325 N. Van Buren, LLC v. T-3 Group, Ltd., 716 N.W.2d 822, 841 (Wis. 
2006) (Bradley, J. dissenting) (quoting Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 180 
(Wis. 2005)). 
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claim for economic damages. (Br. of Appellee 17.) But Enterprises is not asserting a 
negligence tort claim—Development Corp. is. Thus, RB&G's argument is not on point. 
R As Numerous Other Jurisdictions Have Found, a Special Relationship 
Exists Between Engineering Professionals and Their Clients. 
As noted in Development Corp.'s opening brief, numerous other jurisdictions have 
recognized the limit of the ever-expanding economic loss rule. This Court has the power 
to interpret existing case law, including that from the Utah Supreme Court, and fashion 
law and remedies accordingly. Development Corp. is not asking this Court to exceed its 
authority or to ignore stare decisis. The Utah Supreme Court has held that some 
professionals owe an independent tort duty to their clients, and it is an open question 
whether professional engineers are in that group. It is perfectly within this Court's 
authority to speak to that issue. 
A special relationship exists between professional engineers and their clients in 
part due to information asymmetry and because other parties rely on the engineers' 
purported expertise and conclusions. Just as with a real estate broker and his or her 
clients, a surveyor and his or her clients, and builders-developers and their clients, the 
Utah Supreme Court has not been reluctant to find a special relationship and preclude 
application of the economic loss rule where there is a duty to be "competent" in a 
professional's relationship with his or her client. Hennansen v. Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235, 
241 (Utah 2002). 
For clarity, Development Corp. asks that this Court preclude application of the 
economic loss rule only where parties' risk is not allocated by contract, which is the case 
14 
This is precisely the case here. Development Corp. hired and relied upon RB&G 
to conduct an analysis of the Alpine Brook property. RB&G's negligence and breaches 
resulted in damages that it knew would affect not only Development Corp.8 (or its 
successor-in-interest, Enterprises), but others, like the would-be homeowners. Indeed, 
the foreseeability professional engineers have with respect to damages should they 
negligently perform their duties is one unique feature of engineers that gives rise to an 
independent duty, which is especially prominent in the instant case. In other words, 
engineers can foresee that their clients will suffer Herculean financial harm if the 
engineers' tests, analyses, and reports are flawed due to negligence on the engineers' part. 
As engineers are often involved at the beginning of a development, as RB&G was here, 
the engineers know their clients rely upon them for professional, competent advice with 
respect to development design and construction. If the engineers are negligent, they 
know their clients will suffer the financial consequences. 
Moreover, Utah courts have found that parties subject to a special relationship do 
not always allocate their risk with contracts. West v. Inter-Financial, Inc., 139 P.3d 
1059, 1064 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). In a particularly instructive and analogous case (which 
here. Pursuant to the assignment from Development Corp. to Enterprises of 
Development Corp.'s interest in the contracts with RB&G, Development Corp. retained 
no interest in those contracts and lost privity with RB&G. 
8
 Specifically, RB&G should be keenly aware of its duties to third parties. In 
Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel! Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 
1986), RB&G (there styled as "Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc.") argued that based on a 
lack of contractual privity, it could not be liable for its negligence. The Court ultimately 
found a special relationship between a surveyor and third parties despite lack of 
contractual privity. 
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RB&G barely addresses because of its harm to RB&G's position), the Utah Supreme 
Court found a "special relationship" between an accountant and a third party despite the 
lack of contractual privity, thereby subjecting the accountant to economic damage in spite 
of the economic loss rule. Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). The 
supreme court went on to hold that a third party could maintain a negligence action 
against an accountant where the third party relied on the accountant's report and where 
the accountant knew that the party would rely on the report for a particular purpose. Id. 
at 808. Speaking to privity between the parties, the court clarified that "lack of privity is 
not a defense where an accountant... is aware of the fact that his work will be relied on 
by a party or parties .. . ." Id. 
Milliner is relevant to the instant case because the accountant knew the party 
would rely upon his report, just as in our case, RB&G knew Development Corp. and/or 
Enterprises and other parties (like subcontractors, the city, and homeowners) would rely 
upon RB&G's two reports. And privity or not (although Development Corp. does not ask 
this Court to permit tort recovery when an engineer is in privity with the injured party), 
the Utah Supreme Court suggests that where a professional knows that a party—even a 
third party, in Milliner's case—will rely upon the professional's report for a particular 
purpose, that party can assert a negligence claim against the professional because a 
"special relationship" exists. 
As discussed in Development Corp./Enterprises' opening brief, Utah courts have 
found a "special relationship" between other parties as well. There is a "special 
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relationship" between builder-developers and their customers, even though those parties 
typically allocate their risk by contract. Yazd v. Woodside Homes Corp., 143 P.3d 283, 
287 (Utah 2006). And as noted above, there is a "special relationship" between surveyor 
and third parties, despite lack of privity of contract. Price-Orem Investment Co. v. 
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986). 
Additionally, in Hermansen v. Tasulis, the Utah Supreme Court found a special 
relationship between real estate brokers and their clients. 48 P.3d 235, 241 (Utah 2002). 
In finding the "special relationship" in Hermansen, the court reasoned that a real estate 
agent owes a duty, independent of any express or implied contract, "to be honest, ethical, 
and competent" in his or her relationship with the client. Id. Real estate professionals 
cannot, the court held, breach their duty to be competent, and not be liable for their 
actions. Id. 
Similarly, engineering professionals occupy a comparable status in their industry. 
Companies and individuals wholly rely upon engineering professionals to provide 
accurate, complete, competent advice and reports. To the extent engineering 
professionals fail that standard, they must be held accountable for the consequences. 
Nineteen other jurisdictions in all have exempted professionals, including 
engineers, architects, and design professionals, from the protection of the economic loss 
rule based on the professionals' foreseeability of the damages and on the injured party's 
reliance on the professional's expertise and knowledge, about which the professional is 
aware. These jurisdictions include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
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Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington, and the 
relevant cases from these jurisdictions are laid out in Appellants' opening brief. 
RB&G has not addressed these jurisdictions' persuasive arguments for refusing to 
apply the economic loss rule to professionals like engineers, but rather, chose to argue 
"vertical stare decisis" and "horizontal stare decisis" to persuade this Court not to follow 
its sister courts. These nineteen jurisdictions wisely limited this swelling exception that 
would swallow tort law entirely, and Utah courts should do the same. 
C. RB&G Cannot Argue the Contradiction that the Court Should Award 
Contract Damages, Then Argue the Court Should Award Tort Damages, 
When RB&G Disclaims ALL Damages. 
In the section of its brief arguing in favor of the economic loss rule to insulate 
RB&G from liability, it writes that "any damages are traceable solely to the reports and 
RB&G's contractual obligations." (Br. of Appellee 20.) It also states that 
"[Development Corp.'s] remedy is a breach of contract claim." (Br. of Appellee 23.) 
But earlier in its brief, RB&G argued that Development Corp./Enterprises cannot recover 
contract damages due to the assignment. (Br. of Appellee 8-14.) 
RB&G argues these contradictions without admitting their illogical, inequitable 
conclusions: that RB&G will completely avoid liability for its negligence and breaches of 
contract if the Court precludes Development Corp. and Enterprises from recovering. This 
Court should hold RB&G responsible for its negligence and breaches of the two 
contracts. 
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D. Professional Engineering Firms Should Be Exempt From the Protection of 
the Economic Loss Rule Due, In Part, To Circumstances Like This One. 
In addition to the numerous reasons laid out in Development Corp.'s opening brief 
as to why professional engineering firms like RB&G should be exempt from the 
economic loss rule, this case presents another reason. But for the assignment from 
Development Corp. to Enterprises, this case would not be in this Court. There would be 
no question that RB&G breached its contracts with Development Corp., and 
Development Corp. would be recovering contract damages under those contracts. 
But that did not occur here. A common place corporate reorganization by 
Development Corp. and the assignment to Enterprises potentially sequestered RB&G's 
breaches and negligence in a legal black hole from which no party could recover 
damages. 
The Court should not permit professional engineers, to whom clients turn for 
technical expertise, to avoid liability based on as unrelated business decision by one of its 
clients. 
CONCLUSION 
Development Corp. and Enterprises respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the trial court and, based on the foregoing, find disputed issues of material facts. It 
cannot be the case that RB&G's arguments win the day. That result would make RB&G 
immune from its negligence and its conceded breaches, which is neither equitable nor 
adhering to existing law on assignments, privity, breach of contract actions, or the 
economic loss rule. Therefore, the Court should reverse the trial court, allow Enterprises 
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to recover for the lost fourteen units, and refuse to shield RB&G's negligence (as to 
Development Corp.) with the economic loss rule. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of July 2007. 
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C. 
Stephen Quesenbarry 
Charles L. PerschoY 
Attorneys for Plainhffs/Appellants 
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